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IMPROVING THE ODDS OF THE
CENTRAL HUDSON BALANCING TEST:
RESTRICTING COMMERCIAL SPEECH AS
A LAST RESORT
I. INTRODUCTION
In the twenty years since the landmark decision of Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,1 which was
the first decision to afford purely commercial speech protection under
the First Amendment,2 the United States Supreme Court has struggled
to define the scope of that protection and, consequently, the level of
scrutiny that should be applied to legislation that seeks to restrict com-
mercial speech.' The result of this struggle is a series of puzzling and of-
ten paradoxical decisions that make it difficult for scholars to pinpoint
the precise status of commercial speech within the First Amendment
hierarchy.4 The Court's confusing and continuously changing view of
1. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides that: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Ild.
3. See generally Bruce P. Keller, The First Amendment and Regulation of Advertising.
954 PLI/CORP 55,56 (Sept. 17,1996). Commercial speech was initially defined as speech that
does "no more than propose a commercial transaction." ld. (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,385 (1973)). In 1980, the Court rede-
fined commercial speech to include "expression related solely to the economic interests of
the speaker and its audience." Id (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)). In 1993, the Court returned to the Pittsburgh
Press standard of asking whether the speech "does no more than propose a commercial
transaction." Id. (citing City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422
(1993)). See also Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial
Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 429,432 (1971).
4. RoY L. MOORE, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW AND ETHICS 159 (1994). See also
Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1181,1205 (1988).
The First Amendment hierarchy consists of three tiers. At the top of the hierarchy are
those categories of speech that have been deemed fundamental contributors to the market-
place of ideas. They include political, artistic, religious, and scientific forms of expression.
When the government attempts to restrict these types of expression, the court will apply
strict judicial scrutiny. Under the court's strict scrutiny analysis, the government bears the
heavy burden of proving that the restriction is necessary to further a compelling state inter-
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commercial speech has appropriately been analogized to a pendulum5
that swings back and forth from almost full protection to virtually no
protection.
In 1996, the confusion surrounding this form of expression persisted
as the Supreme Court issued its seventh commercial speech decision in
three years.7 In 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island,8 the Court issued a con-
est, and that it is implementing the least restrictive means available to achieve that interest.
Jeffery M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297,329 (1995).
The next tier in the First Amendment hierarchy involves expression that is afforded an
intermediate level of judicial scrutiny. Under an intermediate level of scrutiny, a law will be
upheld if it serves a substantial state interest and the means used are reasonable, although
not perfect. Id. The Courts generally apply this level of scrutiny to commercial speech re-
strictions, content-neutral restrictions, and time, place, and manner restrictions.
The final, and lowest, tier in the First Amendment hierarchy encompasses fighting
words, obscenity, pornography and libel. Laws that aim to restrict these forms of expression
are subject to a rational basis review. Under this minimal level of scrutiny, the government
simply must prove that the restriction serves a legitimate interest and that the means chosen
to achieve that interest are reasonable. Id. at 330.
5. Dennis William Bishop, Note, Building The House On A Weak Foundation, Eden-
field v. Fane & the Current State of the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1143,
1144 (1995). See MOORE, supra note 4, at 159. There has been "no evolution of constitu-
tional law on commercial free speech, but instead the Court has almost erratically switched
from one [level of judicial scrutiny] to another, usually dependent on the individual facts of a
particular case." Id.
6. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court considered commercial speech to have a high degree
of constitutional protection in light of its "indispensable" role in our capitalistic society. Vir-
ginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765. Two years later, however, the same Court decided that
commercial speech only deserved a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,456 (1978). In 1980, the Court ultimately settled on according commer-
cial speech an intermediate level of constitutional protection. Central Hudson Gas & Elec-
tric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). However, six years later, the
Court again shifted and held that the legislature should decide whether or not to restrict the
dissemination of commercial speech. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328,
344 (1986). In 1993, the Court returned to affording commercial speech greater protection
when it held that:
[t]he commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, pro-
vides a forum where ideas and information flourish. Some ideas and information
are vital, some of slight worth. But the general rule is that the speaker and the
audience, not the government, assess the value of the information presented.
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,767 (1993).
7. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (blanket ban on off-site ad-
vertising of alcohol prices found unconstitutional); Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S.
618 (1995) (thirty day waiting period before attorneys could solicit accident victims found to
be constitutional); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (prohibiting placement
of alcohol content on beer labels found unconstitutional); Ibanez v. Fla. Dept. of Bus. &
Prof'l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994) (regulation prohibiting attorney from listing CPA cre-
dentials found unconstitutional); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (FCC
statute prohibiting broadcast of lottery advertisement in states that do not permit lottery
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voluted eight-part decision striking down a Rhode Island statute that
prohibited vendors and the media from advertising the prices of alco-
holic beverages.9 Although the Supreme Court was unanimous in
holding that the Rhode Island ban violated the First Amendment, it was
deeply divided as to why." This noticeable lack of consensus indicates
how unsettled the Court remains about the degree of protection that
should be afforded commercial speech.
The 44 Liquormart decision is particularly significant because it calls
into question the future viability of the current four-part balancing test
that is the standard against which all First Amendment commercial
speech challenges are measured. This standard, commonly referred to
as the Central Hudson2 balancing test, was created by the Supreme
Court in 1980 to provide a consistent analytical framework for lower
courts to apply when reviewing legislation intended to promote impor-
tant societal policies by restricting commercial speech. In order for
commercial speech to warrant First Amendment protection under this
standard, it must (1) concern lawful activity and not be misleading.13 If
the speech meets this threshold, it may be regulated only if (2) the as-
serted government interest is substantial; (3) the regulation directly ad-
vances the asserted government interest; and (4) the regulation is no
found constitutional); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (regulation prohibiting solicita-
tion by CPA found unconstitutional); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S.
410 (1993) (ordinance prohibiting newsracks that displayed commercial material, but not
prohibiting newsracks that displayed traditional noncommercial materials, found unconstitu-
tional).
8. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
9. Id.
10. Id. There were four distinct views among the Justices as to why the Rhode Island
ban violated the First Amendment, none of which received majority support. Justice
O'Connor, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Souter and Breyer, struck down the stat-
utes as failing the existing Central Hudson standard. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ken-
nedy and Ginsburg, similarly found the Rhode Island statutes to be unconstitutional under
this existing standard; however, the Stevens' plurality proposed adopting a stricter level of
scrutiny for bans that restrict truthful, nonmisleading speech for purposes unrelated to the
preservation of a fair bargaining process. Justice Scalia also found the statutes to be uncon-
stitutional under the Central Hudson standard, but did so only because the parties had failed
to offer an alternative standard of review. Finally, Justice Thomas rejected the existing in-
termediate standard entirely and would afford truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech
the same level of protection as political speech. See infra Part IV B.
11. Keller, supra note 3, at 79-80.
12. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
13. Id. at 566. See also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376 (1973).
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more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. 4 The regulation
must satisfy each of these four prongs in order to be constitutionally
valid. 5
While the Court's application of the four Central Hudson factors led
to the appropriate result in 44 Liquonnart, the current test does not
consistently provide adequate assurance that truthful, non-misleading
commercial speech will survive judicial scrutiny.'6 It is an ad hoc bal-
ancing test 17 that is susceptible to manipulation, particularly when ap-
plied to legislation designed to restrict "vice" activities such as gam-
bling, smoking, and alcohol consumption. Instead of applying a
consistent level of judicial scrutiny to commercial speech restrictions,
courts tend to use a sliding scale under which the level of scrutiny is de-
pendent upon the governmental interest being asserted. Therefore, as
commercial speech enters into its third decade under First Amendment
jurisprudence and increasingly becomes the target of numerous restric-
tions,'" this Comment recommends that certain modifications must be
14. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. Surviving the first two prongs of the test is seldom
a problem in commercial speech cases. The majority of the confusion and disagreement cen-
ters on the third and fourth prongs under which the Court reviews the "fit" between the
speech restriction and the underlying governmental interest.
15. Id.
16. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 431 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., concurring). See also Scott Joachim, Note, Seeing Beyond the Smoke and Mir-
rors: A Proposal For the Abandonment of the Commercial Speech Doctrine and an Analysis
of Recent Tobacco Advertising Regulations, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 517 (1997)
(criticizing the Central Hudson test as being an "ad hoc test resting on unfounded assump-
tions and illogical distinctions."). See also Valarie D. Wood, Note, The Precarious Position
of Commercial Speech. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995), 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 612 (1996). The test, as it currently reads, is "manipulated just as easily to up-
hold regulations as to invalidate them. When the Court applies Central Hudson to each case,
the outcome is indistinguishable except upon the specific facts of the case. Only if the identi-
cal fact pattern arose could the outcome in the next case be predicted." I. at 620.
17. R. GEORGE WRIGHT, SELLING WORDS, FREE SPEECH IN A COMMERCIAL
CULTURE 62 (1997). The author has characterized the Central Hudson test as a framework
that "combines apparent rigidity with remarkable vagueness." Id. See also P. Cameron De-
Vore, The Two Faces of Commercial Speech Under the First Amendment, 12 COMM. LAW. 23
(1994) ( The author believes that the controversy surrounding this test is due to the fact that
it has done more for the appearance of orderly analysis than it did for orderly analysis it-
self.). See also Roxanne Hovland & Gary B. Wilcox, The Future of Alcoholic Beverage Ad-
vertising, 9 COMM. & L. April 1987, at 5, 11.
18. The more prominent and controversial of these restrictions is the Food and Drug
Administration's comprehensive restrictions on tobacco advertising that were signed into law
by President Clinton in August 1996. A federal district judge in North Carolina recently is-
sued a decision on these ad restrictions. See Coyne Beahme, Inc. v. United States Food &
Drug Admin., 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997). For a detailed discussion on the FDA
regulations, see: Sandra E. McKay, et al., The FDA's Proposed Rules Regulating Tobacco
and Underage Smoking and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, J. PUB. POL. & MKT. 296
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made to the Central Hudson balancing test to better insulate commer-
cial speech's constitutional protection from further derogation.
The Court can begin by revising the test's malleable fourth prong.
In Central Hudson, the Court interpreted the "no more extensive than
necessary" language as requiring that the government use the least re-
strictive means when regulating the dissemination of truthful, nonmis-
leading commercial speech.19 However, in 1986, this standard appar-
ently was reduced to a mere rational basis test when the Court
determined that it was "up to the legislature" to determine the propri-
ety of the speech restrictions.' Since 1989, the Court has retreated, at
least in theory, from this rational basis review, and now requires that
there be a "reasonable fit" between the ends and means chosen by the
legislature when it restricts commercial speech.2' Unfortunately, over
the past seven years, the Court has offered only vague and ambiguous
language to elucidate what this "reasonable fit" standard requires." At
(Sept. 1, 1996) (1996 WL 12334051).
19. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
564 (1980). While the Court did not explicitly use the phrase "least restrictive means," it
held that "if the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction
on commercial speech, the excessive restriction cannot survive." Id. The term "reasonable"
was never mentioned.
20. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328,344 (1986).
21. Board of Trustees of the State University of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
See also Tara L. Lavery, Note, Commercial Speech Suffers A First Amendment Blow in
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 549,550 (1994).
22. In 44 Liquormart, Justice O'Connor summarized the language used by the Court to
define "reasonable fit." 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 529-30 (1996)
(O'Connor, J., concurring on judgment). In Fox, the Court defined reasonable fit as a "fit
that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best
disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served." Fox, 492 U.S. at 480.
While the government "need not employ the least restrictive means to accomplish its goal,
the fit between means and ends must be 'narrowly tailored."' Id
In Cincinnati v. Discovery Network Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993), the Court determined that
in order to satisfy the fourth prong, the State's regulation must indicate a "carefu[lI] calcu-
lat[ion of] the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed by its prohibi-
tion." 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 529-30 (citing Discovery Network Inc., 507 U.S. at 417).
The Discovery Network Court stated that the "existence of numerous and obvious less-
burdensome alternatives to the restriction of commercial speech... is certainly a relevant
consideration in determining whether the 'fit between ends and means is reasonable." Dis-
covery Network, 507 U.S. at 417-8 n.13.
Recently, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 515 U.S. 476 (1995), the Court determined
that the availability of less burdensome alternatives to achieve the asserted policy interest
signals that the fit between the legislature's objectives and the means chosen to accomplish
those objectives may be too imprecise to withstand First Amendment scrutiny. 44 Liq uor-
mar 517 U.S. at 529 (citing to Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1593-94). Later that year, in Florida Bar
v. Went For 14 Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995), the Court determined that "if alternative channels
permit communication of the restricted speech, the regulation is more likely to be considered
1998]
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best, the "reasonable fit" threshold can be defined as falling somewhere
between the stringent "least restrictive means" standard and the lax
"rational basis" standard.
This imprecise evidentiary standard is problematic because it allows
courts to be overly deferential to the legislature's conjecture and
speculation regarding the beneficial effects of restricting advertising.
This Comment proposes that this "reasonable fit" standard be replaced
with the more stringent "least restrictive means" standard that was in-
tended when the Court initially created the Central Hudson balancing
test. Implementing this proposed revision would provide greater pro-
tection for commercial speech by imposing a heavier evidentiary burden
on the government to demonstrate that restricting the free flow of
truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech is the most feasible and
least speech restrictive alternative in which to directly and materially
advance the government's substantial interest.
Before analyzing this proposed revision, Part II provides the reader
with background on the commercial speech doctrine and its precarious
position within the First Amendment hierarchy. Part III discusses how
the Court, in recent years, has moved toward salvaging the Central
Hudson balancing framework by refining and strengthening the test's
final two prongs. Part IV specifically focuses on the 44 Liquormart de-
cision and how several members of the Court appeared willing to adopt
more stringent methods of interpreting the fourth prong of the Central
Hudson test. But, because there was no consensus among the Justices
regarding these alternatives, there continues to be no clear guidelines
regarding the level of scrutiny to apply under this final prong.
Part V analyzes how abandoning the "reasonable fit" standard in fa-
vor of the more rigorous "least restrictive means" standard will: (1) re-
duce inconsistent decisions by the courts, (2) force a legislature to inves-
tigate and pursue more effective methods of achieving its policy goals
that do not involve restricting speech, and (3) provide commercial
speech with the heightened constitutional protection it deserves. This
proposed revision, however, does not completely close off the option of
restricting certain forms of commercial speech. Instead, it would im-
pose a higher level of responsibility upon the government to demon-
strate that non-speech restrictive alternatives or a narrower speech re-
striction failed to effectively achieve its asserted policy initiatives before
it would be permitted to adopt a broader speech restriction.




In short, this "least restrictive means" standard will finally strike the
proper balance between protecting the consumer and protecting the
Constitution by reducing the arbitrariness surrounding the regulation of
commercial speech.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
A. No Protection to Almost Full Protection
Contrary to the plain language of the First Amendment, freedom of
speech is "not absolute at all times and under all circumstances." The
Supreme Court has held that there are certain "well-defined and nar-
rowly limited classes of speech"24 that are unworthy of First Amend-
ment protection because they fail to contribute to the marketplace of
ideas.2z Initially, commercial speech was considered to fall within this
unprotected category.
Commercial speech's unprotected status was the result of the Su-
preme Court's 1942 decision in Valentine v. Chrestensen.2 In this case,
F.J. Chrestensen challenged a New York City sanitation ordinance that
prohibited the distribution of commercial handbills on public streets. '
Even though Chrestensen's handbill included both commercial and
non-commercial speech, the Supreme Court viewed the entire handbill
as commercial speech and upheld the ordinance prohibiting its distribu-
tion.2 The Court held that while the government may not "unduly bur-
den or proscribe" the dissemination of information or opinion of public
interest, "the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as
respects purely commercial advertising." 29  As a result, commercial
23. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,571 (1942).
24. Id. at 571.
25. Id. at 572.
26. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
27. Id. FJ. Chrestensen purchased a decommissioned U.S. Naval submarine believing
that he could make money by traveling along the eastern coast and allowing the public to
tour his boat for a fee. After arriving and docking his submarine in New York City,
Chrestensen had handbills printed up with a diagram of the submarine, its location in the
harbor, and an advertisement inviting the public to take guided tours of the boat for a quar-
ter. Chrestensen was stopped by the police and informed that his commercial handbill vio-
lated a city sanitation ordinance. The ordinance at issue specifically prohibited the distribu-
tion of commercial handbills, but permitted the distribution of political handbills.
28. Id. at 55. The Court took the position that the First Amendment was not intended
to protect speech that merely enables the speaker to "hawk his wares." See also Thomas H.
Jackson & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First
Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 14 (1979).
29. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54.
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speech was not entitled to any protection under the First Amendment
and would not be entitled to any protection for the next thirty years.3
In 1975, however, the Court formally rejected the proposition that
all statutes regulating commercial advertising are immune from consti-
tutional challenge. In Bigelow v. Virginia,3' the Court addressed the le-
gality of a Virginia statute that made it a misdemeanor to sell or circu-
late any publication that encouraged the procuring of an abortion.32
Jeffrey C. Bigelow, the director and managing editor of the Virginia
Weekly, was charged and convicted of violating this statute when he ran
a paid advertisement for a New York City abortion referral service.3
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction.
In its decision, the Court distinguished the facts in this case from the
Valentine case by stating that the Virginia Weekly advertisement "did
more than simply propose a commercial transaction; ' 3' it also contained
factual information that clearly was of public interest.35 Although the
Bigelow Court determined that speech that both proposes a commercial
transaction and provides factual information is deserving of First
Amendment protection, it left unanswered the issue of whether purely
commercial speech also was deserving of First Amendment protection.
In the following term, the Court was squarely confronted with this
issue.36 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
30. The Valentine decision gave rise to the commercial/noncommercial dichotomy that
continues to be the theoretical impediment to elevating commercial speech's status within
the First Amendment hierarchy.
31. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
32. Id-
33. Id at 812. The advertisement informed the reader that abortions were now legal in
New York and that there were no residency requirements. If the reader wanted immediate
placement in accredited hospitals and clinics at a low cost, they should call or write the
Women's Pavilion in New York City. The ad further stated that the entire matter would be
kept "strictly confidential." Id.
34. Id at 822.
35. Id.
36. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976). Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, differentiated this case from
other speech cases by framing the issue as follows:
Our pharmacist does not wish to editorialize on any subject, cultural, philosophical,
or political. He does not wish to report any particularly newsworthy fact, or to
make generalized observations even about commercial matters. The "idea" he
wishes to communicate is simply this: "I will sell you the X prescription drug at the
Y price." Our question, then, is whether this communication is wholly outside
the protection of the First Amendment.
Id at 760-61.
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sumer Council, Inc.,3 a citizen's group challenged a Virginia statute that
prohibited licensed pharmacists from publishing, advertising, or pro-
moting the price of prescription medications.38 Virginia's principle ra-
tionale for enacting the ban was that it was necessary to preserve the
professional image of pharmacists.39 The Court disagreed, however, and
determined that the State's interest in professionalism was clearly out-
weighed by the consumer's need for information as to who is offering
what products and at what prices.' In response to the State's assertion
that commercial speech lacks protection because it fails to enlighten
public decisionmaking, the Court recognized that in our free enterprise
system, "the free flow of commercial information is indispensable"'" be-
cause it allows the public to make "intelligent and well-informed" 42 eco-
nomic decisions when allocating resources in their day-to-day lives.43 In
fact, the Court went so far as to say that an individual's interest in the
free flow of commercial information "may be as keen, if not keener by
far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate." 4 Such
language invalidated the commonly held belief that commercial speech
is so removed from any exposition of ideas that it is undeserving of First
Amendment protection.45
While the Court ultimately concluded that commercial speech is en-
titled to a certain degree of First Amendment protection, it stopped
short of affording it absolute immunity from government regulation. In
37. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
38. Id. at 750-51 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §54-524.35 (1976)).
39. IE at 752,766-77. The State also argued that price advertising of prescription drugs
would jeopardize the pharmacist's expertise and the customer's health because aggressive
price competition would mean that a pharmacist could not devote the time required for ex-
pert compounding, handling, and dispensing of drugs. In short, the quality of care would suf-
fer if price advertising were allowed Id at 767-68. See also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA
AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT §12-6 (1994).
40. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 763 (1976). In Justice Blackmun's opinion, the prohibition of drug price informa-
tion struck hardest the poor, the sick, and the elderly, who the least able to shop from phar-
macist to pharmacist and who spent a disproportionate amount of their income on prescrip-
tion drugs. Id.
41. Id. at 765.
42. Id.
43. The Court found that there is an alternative to regulating speech. The "alternative
is to assume that information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best
interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open
the channels of communication rather than to close them." Id. at 770.
44. Id. at 763.
45. Id. at 762.
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a footnote, the Court recognized that certain "commonsense differ-
ences ' 46 existed between commercial and non-commercial speech, sug-
gesting that "a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that
the free flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is un-
impaired."' 7 While this footnote made clear that commercial speech re-
ceived something less than full protection under the First Amendment,
it failed to delineate clear guidance as to the precise scope of that pro-
tection.48
B. The Central Hudson Balancing Test
Four years later, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission of New York,49 the Supreme Court formulated a
standard to apply to legislation designed to restrict truthful, nonmis-
leading commercial speech.' The case involved an order issued by the
New York Public Service Commission prohibiting all public utilities
from promoting the use of electricity.51 The order was in response to
the Commission's findings that, because of the energy crisis at the time,
it needed to conserve its fuel supplies and reduce public demand. 2 Af-
ter the fuel shortage had eased, however, the Commission voted to con-
tinue the ban on promotional advertising.53 Central Hudson Gas &
46. Id. at 771 n.24.
47. Id at 772 n.24. The Court noted that there are certain inherent characteristics
about commercial speech that make it unnecessary for court's to guarantee its unfettered
dissemination. IdL First, unlike political commentary that tends to be highly subjective,
commercial speech is more objective. Id Thus, individuals are better able to evaluate the
accuracy of these commercial messages and the legality of the underlying activity. Id. Sec-
ond, because advertising is the "sine qua non of commercial profits," it is more durable and
less likely of being chilled by regulations. Id. The court believes that based on these two fac-
tors, the greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech, it was unnecessary to apply
strict scrutiny to laws that seek to regulate or restrict commercial speech. Id.
48. Mary B. Nutt, Recent Development, Trends in the First Amendment Protection of
Commercial Speech, 41 VAND. L. REv. 173, 180 (1988). "Virginia Board and its progeny
represent the peak of constitutional protection for commercial speech. Later cases have re-
fined the commercial speech doctrine and concomitantly narrowed the [F]irst [A]mendment
protection of commercial expression." Id at 185. See also Leonard M. Niehoff, The Su-
preme Court Clarifies The Commercial Speech Doctrine-Again, 75 MICH. BJ. 828 (August
1986).
49. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
50. Id
51. Id at 558.
52- Id. at 559. The order was "based on the Commission's finding that 'the intercon-
nected utility system in New York State does not have sufficient fuel stocks or sources of
supply to continue furnishing all customer demands for the 1973-1974 winter."' Id (citations
omitted).
53. Id at 563.
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Electric Corporation challenged the ban as an infringement of its First
Amendment rights.' The Commission defended its decision on the
grounds that there was a substantial state and national interest in en-
ergy conservation.55
In its decision, the Supreme Court began by reiterating the
"commonsense distinctions" between commercial speech and other va-
rieties of protected speech.,6 In light of these inherent distinctions, the
Court determined that the Constitution accords a lesser degree of pro-
tection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed
forms of expression.Y The Court ultimately settled on an intermediate
level of scrutiny under which the level of protection is based on the ex-
pression at issue and the governmental interests being served by the
regulation.58 In order for the lower courts to apply this intermediate
scrutiny, the Court designed the following four-part balancing test:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is pro-
tected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come
within that provision, [1] it at least must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading. Next, we ask [2] whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield posi-
tive answers, we must determine [3] whether the regulation di-
rectly advances the governmental interest asserted, and [4]
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest.59
In applying the test, the Court determined that the promotional ad-
vertising ban satisfied the first three prongs, but failed the fourth
prong.' While the Commission directly advanced its substantial inter-
est in promoting energy conservation and maintaining fair and accurate
rates by banning promotional advertising, the Court concluded that by
prohibiting all forms of promotional advertising the Commission's or-
der was more extensive than necessary.6' The Commission failed to
54. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y. 447 U.S. 557,
560 (1980).
55. Id at 560-1.
56. I& at 562 (quotations omitted).
57. Id at 563. See also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,456 (1978).
58. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
59. See id. at 566 (brackets added).
60. 1& at 566-71.
61. The Court held that the complete ban on promotional advertising could be, in fact,
blocking the Commission from achieving their goal of energy conservation and more accu-
rate rates, because the ban prohibited Central Hudson from advertising their "heat pump,"
which both sides acknowledged would be a major improvement in electric heating. Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 570 (1980). Fur-
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show how a more limited restriction on promotional advertising would
not adequately satisfy the State's interest in conservation.62 In other
words, the Commission failed to show that a complete ban on promo-
tional advertising was the least restrictive means in which to advance
the asserted policy goals.63
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, offered a two-part explana-
tion regarding the fourth prong. He stated that "[t]he State cannot
regulate speech that poses no danger to the asserted state interest...
nor can it completely suppress information when narrower restrictions
on expression would serve its interest as well." 6 The Court found the
ban to be unconstitutional because the Commission's asserted interest
could have been equally served by either requiring counterspeech or a
narrower speech restriction.6 In doing so, the Court signaled that re-
strictions on commercial speech should be used as a last resort or in
combination with non-speech restrictive alternatives.
C. The Diminished Protection of Commercial Speech
While the Central Hudson decision arguably should have resolved
any controversy over the level of protection afforded to commercial
speech, problems soon developed as the Court began to interpret and
apply the balancing test inconsistent, particularly the fourth prong.'
After Central Hudson, there was a presumption against regulating
commercial speech unless the proponent could clearly demonstrate that
the regulation was the least speech restrictive method available for
achieving the asserted policy goals.67 However, by the mid-1980s, this
presumption weakened as the Court progressively moved away from
the more stringent "least restrictive means" standard and began to ap-
thermore, the ban precluded Central Hudson from promoting electric heat as a "backup" to
solar and other more efficient heat sources. Id.
6Z Id. at 570.
63. Id. at 570-71.
64. Id. at 565. See also John M. Blim, Comment, Free Speech and Health Claims Under
the NLEA of 1990: Applying a Rehabilitated Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech, 88
Nw. U. L. REV. 733 (1994).
65. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570-71.
66. See Todd J. Locher, Comment, Board of Trustees of the State University of New
York v. Fox: Cutting Back on Commercial Speech Standards, 75 IOwA L. REV. 1335, 1339
(1990).
67. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570-71.
68. See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), and Zaurderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985). In Zaurderer, the Court considered whether an
Ohio attorney, who advertised to women that may have been injured through using the
Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, violated the disciplinary rules of the Ohio Office of Disci-
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ply a more flexible "reasonable fit" standard under which the Court
generally defers to the government's subjective discretion and judg-
ment. This departure from the "least restrictive means" standard was
primarily the result of two decisions.
1. The Posadas decision
The first was the Court's 1986 decision in Posadas de Puerto Rico
Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico.69 In the 5-4 decision, the ma-
jority applied a highly deferential method of analysis in upholding a
Puerto Rican statute that prohibited casinos from advertising directly to
the residents of Puerto Rico, but permitted advertising aimed at tour-
ists." Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, provided a superficial
application of the Central Hudson factors to the Posadas facts. First,
Justice Rehnquist was satisfied that the advertising of casino gambling
concerned a lawful activity and was not fraudulent or misleading." Sec-
ond, he found that the government's interest in reducing the harmful ef-
fects of gambling such as "the increase of local crime, the fostering of
prostitution, the development of corruption, and the infiltration of or-
ganized crime" was deemed substantial enough to justify regulation.
After satisfying the first and second prongs, the Court concluded
that the last two steps of the analysis required "a consideration of the
'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish
those ends." Rather than making a careful and thorough inquiry into
plinary Counsel. Zaurderer, 471 U.S. at 626-28. In applying the Central Hudson balancing
test, the Court determined that the first and second prongs were met but that the third prong
was not. Id. at 647. The Court did not agree that the rule regulating attorney advertising
directly advanced the State's interest in preventing consumer deception. Id. But, more im-
portantly for our purposes, the Court rejected the appellant's contention that the state's dis-
closure requirements needed to be the least restrictive means of advancing the government's
interest. Id. at 651 fn.14. Rather, the Court applied a less stringent standard when it deter-
mined that the regulations be "reasonably related to the state's interest in preventing decep-
tion of consumers." Id. at 651. This appeared to alter the interpretation of the fourth prong
from a least restrictive means requirement to a reasonable ends/means requirement. Id. see
also Denise D. Trimler, Note, Perpetuating Confusion in the Commercial Speech Area Ad-
olph Coors Co. v. Brady, 26 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1193, 1204, 1215 (1993).
69. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
70. I. at 330 & 348. In an effort to develop its tourism industry, the Puerto Rican Leg-
islature enacted The Games of Chance Act of 1948, which legalized the playing of roulette,
dice, and card games in licensed gambling facilities. Id. at 331-32. The Act, however, in-
cluded a provision that "no gambling room shall be permitted to advertise ... to the public of
Puerto Rico." Id. (citing P.R. LAWS ANN., tit. 15, §77 (1972)).
71. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328,340-41(1986).




whether the regulation directly advanced the asserted goals by means
that were no more extensive than necessary, the Court simply deferred
to the subjective beliefs of the Puerto Rican legislature. 4 This high
level of deference was evident in the Court's conclusion that the restric-
tion directly advanced the government's asserted interest in protecting
the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.75 Instead of relying on sta-
tistical or anecdotal evidence, the Court based its determination on the
fact that the Puerto Rican legislature believed that the means were rea-
sonable. 6 Justice Rehnquist blindly accepted Puerto Rico's argument
that the ban directly advanced the asserted interest even though the
legislature only chose to regulate the advertising of casino gambling, not
other types of gambling.77 Justice Rehnquist concluded that the legisla-
ture's belief was a reasonable one; one that should not be second-
guessed by the Court.78
Finally, regarding the fourth prong, the Court did not require proof
that the advertising ban was the least restrictive means of protecting its
citizens from the dangers of gambling.79 Instead, the majority applied a
rational basis type analysis when it stated that "it is up to the legisla-
ture" to decide whether less speech restrictive alternatives, such as
counterspeech or a narrower speech restriction, would be an equally ef-
fective and preferable method of protecting its citizens." In essence, the
Posadas Court took the burden of proving that the regulation is no
more extensive than necessary from the proponent's shoulders and
placed it on the opponent's shoulders to disprove.81
74. Id at 342-44.
75. Id at 343.
76. Id. at 341-42. "The Puerto Rico Legislature obviously believed, when it enacted the
advertising restrictions at issue here, that advertising of casino gambling aimed at the resi-
dents of Puerto Rico would serve to increase the demand for the product advertised. We
think the legislature's belief is a reasonable one.. ." Id at 342.
77. The court provided a two-part response to the appellant's argument that the restric-
tion was under-inclusive because it failed to include advertising of other forms of gambling
such as horse racing, cockfighting, and the lottery. First, the Court held that, whether or not
other kinds of gambling are advertised in Puerto Rico, the restrictions on casino advertising
"directly advance the legislature's interest in reducing demand for" gambling. Posadas de
P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 342 (1986). Second, the Court stated that the as-
serted interest of the legislature is not necessarily to reduce all forms of gambling, but to re-
duce the demand for casino gambling. Id. The Court also determined that the restriction
was not under-inclusive because the legislature is in a better position than the Court to weigh
the risks associated with the various forms of gambling. Id.
78. Id. at 342-43.
79. Id.
80. Id at 344.
81. In adopting this deferential approach, the Posadas decision made the Central Hud-
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Justice Rehnquist, however, did not stop there in his attack on
commercial speech. In dicta, he further weakened the level of protec-
tion afforded commercial speech when he stated that as long as the gov-
ernment retained "the greater power to completely ban casino gam-
bling" it also retained "the lesser power to ban [the] advertising of
casino gambling."2 This statement, if taken to its extreme, would allow
the complete suppression of almost all truthful commercial advertising
because most commercial and economic conduct can be regulated by
legislatures."
2. The Fox decision
Three years later, the Court further weakened the level of protec-
tion afforded commercial speech with its decision in Board of the Trus-
tees State University of New York v. Fox." While the Posadas Court im-
plicitly diminished commercial speech's constitutional protection, the
Fox Court performed a more explicit reduction with its broad interpre-
tation of the final prong of the test. In this 5-4 decision, Justice Scalia
wrote that it would be incompatible with commercial speech's subordi-
nate position within the First Amendment hierarchy to mandate that
the least restrictive means be utilized when regulating or restricting
commercial speech.' Justice Scalia interpreted the fourth prong's "no
son balancing test substantially easier for the government to pass. Consequently, more gov-
ernment restrictions on commercial speech would be able to withstand constitutional attack
under such an approach than under the more stringent examination utilized prior to Posadas.
See Arlen W. Langvardt & Eric L. Richards, The Death of Posadas and the Birth of Change
in Commercial Speech Doctrine: Implications of 44 Liquormart, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 483, 499
(1997); See also Philip B. Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: "'Twas
Strange, 'Twas Passing Strange; 'Twas Pitifu, 'Twas Wondrous Pitiful" 1986 SuP. Cr. REV.
1,12.
82. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-46. Justice Rehnquist stated that it would
surely be a strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to the legislature
the authority to totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the legislature the
authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or activity through
advertising on behalf of those who would profit from such increased demand.
Id. at 346. This convoluted logic became known as the "greater-includes-the-lesser" argu-
ment. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §12-15, at 903 (2d ed.
1988).
83. Howard K. Jeruchimowitz, Note, Tobacco Advertisements and Commercial Speech
Balancing: A Potential Cancer to Truthfu Nonmisleading Advertisements of Lawful Prod-
ucts, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 432,445 (1997).
84. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
85. Id. at 478. In Fox, the Court upheld a university regulation that prohibited commer-
cial enterprises from operating on university property. Id. at 471. A representative of
American Future Systems, Inc. (AFS) inadvertently violated the regulation when she at-
tempted to hold a Tupperware party in one of the school's dormitories. Id. at 472. When
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more extensive than reasonably necessary"86 language as merely re-
quiring that there be
[A] 'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to
accomplish those ends.., a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but
reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best dispo-
sition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served
... that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but..
. means narrowly tailored to the desired objectiveY
The Court's decision meant that an ordinance will be unconstitutional
only if it is "substantially excessive, disregarding 'far less restrictive and
more precise means.""S
Whereas this distinction may appear to involve semantics rather
than clear distinctions, the Fox decision emphasized that legislation
regulating or restricting truthful, nonmisleading advertising will be
subject to much less than strict scrutiny by the courts.89 Under the more
stringent "least restrictive means" standard, the government has the
burden of demonstrating that less restrictive regulations could not suffi-
ciently advance the government's asserted interest.90 After the Fox de-
cision, however, the evidentiary burden was reduced, and the govern-
ment is only required to prove that "its regulation of commercial speech
is reasonable and in proportion to its interest."9' Simply stated, the Fox
standard opened the floodgates to more paternalistic restrictions of
commercial speech that previously would have been struck down under
asked to leave by campus police, she refused and was arrested. Ia at 472. Fox, and several
other students, brought suit challenging the regulation as a violation of the First Amend-
ment. Id. at 473.
86. Id. at 477. Justice Scalia observed that if the word "necessary" in the phrase "not
more extensive than is necessary" was strictly interpreted, then a least restrict means test
would be appropriate. Id. at 476. However, if it were interpreted more loosely, then a
"reasonable fit" was all that was required. Id Justice Scalia found support for the latter by
relying on the interpretation of "necessary" as it was used to determine the scope of the
Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316
(1819). Fox, 492 U.S. at 476.
87. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (citations omitted). Consistent with its deferential analysis in
Posadas, the Court then went on to say that "[w]ithin those bounds we leave it to govern-
mental decision makers to judge what manner of regulation may best be employed." Id.
88. Id. at 479 (citations omitted). However, the Court emphasized that this new
"reasonable fit" standard is far different from the "rational basis" test. Id. at 480. While the
Fox Court eliminated the "least restrictive means" standard, it also rejected the "rational
basis" test that the Court seemed to be applying in the Posadas decision. Id
89. Albert P. Mauro Jr., Comment, Commercial Speech After Posadas & Fox: A Ra-
tional Basis Wolf in Intermediate Sheep's Clothing, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1931 (1992).




the "least restrictive means" standard.92
III. REFINING THE CENTRAL HUDSON TEST: THE STRUGGLE FOR
CONSISTENCY
A. The 1993 Decisions: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back
The Supreme Court subsequently retreated somewhat from its def-
erential position in Posadas when it attempted to clarify and strengthen
portions of the Central Hudson test. In 1993, the Court significantly
strengthened the final two prongs of the test with its decisions in City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. 3 and Edenfield v. Fane.94
In Discovery Network, the Court struck down a municipal ordinance
that banned the use of freestanding newsracks for the distribution of
commercial advertising publications.95 In applying the fourth prong, the
Court held that the city failed "to establish a 'reasonable fit' between its
legitimate interests in safety and aesthetics and its choice of a limited
and selective prohibition of [commercial] newsracks as the means cho-
sen to serve those interests."96 By failing to investigate how regulating
the size, shape, appearance, and number of newsracks would serve their
interest, the city had not "carefully calculated" the costs and benefits to
92. IdM
93. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
94. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
95. In order to maintain safe and attractive sidewalks and streets, Cincinnati began to
enforce an old ordinance that banned the use of freestanding newsracks for the distribution
of commercial publications, handbills, or leaflets (e.g. free magazines) on public property.
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 413 (1993). The ban did not,
however, include the freestanding newsracks that were used for the distribution of traditional
publications (e.g. newspapers and magazines). lIL The respondent, who published and dis-
tributed free real estate magazines that advertised properties for sale in various parts of the
country, challenged the ordinance after their permit to install 24 newsracks was revoked be-
cause their newsracks were found to violate the ordinance. Id In applying the Central Hud-
son test, the Court struck down the ban because it did not directly advance the city's interest.
hd at 417. Specifically, while the ban would lead to the removal of 62 commercial newsracks,
it would not address the "harm" caused by the 1,500 to 2,000 noncommercial newsracks that
presumably were identical to the commercial newsracks in size, shape, appearance, and loca-
tion. Id. Any advancement that resulted from the ban was found to be "minute" and insuffi-
cient to satisfy the third and fourth prongs. Id at 418.
Of further significance was the Court's rejection of the city's reasoning that the non-
commercial information remained on the newsracks because it was more valuable in content
than the commercial information. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 424-25. The Court con-
cluded that the city placed too much importance on the commercial/noncommercial distinc-
tion. Id. In so holding, the Court further eroded the commercial/noncommercial dichotomy
that had plagued commercial speech for over fifty years.
96. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 416-17
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speech that were associated with the prohibition.9 While the Court was
unwilling to readopt the "least restrictive means" standard98 in Discov-
ery Network, it did state that "if there are numerous and obvious less-
burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech, that is
certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the 'fit' be-
tween ends and means is reasonable."99 The Court's application of the
fourth prong in Discovery Network constituted a significant departure
from the highly deferential approach of previous decisions.
In Edenfield v. Fane" the Court focused more narrowly on
strengthening the third prong when it struck down a Florida regulation
that prohibited in-person solicitation by certified public accountants. 10
In sharp contrast to its deferential approach in Posadas, the Edenfield
Court held that the government carries the burden of demonstrating
that it is regulating speech to address a serious problem and that the
preventive measures it implements will contribute to solving that prob-
lem.1c The Court held that "[tihis burden is not satisfied by mere
speculation or conjecture; rather a governmental body seeking to sus-
tain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the
harms it recites are real and that its restrictions will in fact alleviate
them to a material degree."'"' In the absence of such a rigorous eviden-
tiary standard, the government could easily "restrict commercial speech
in the service of other objectives that could not themselves justify a
burden on commercial expression.""' This decision would significantly
strengthen the level of scrutiny that courts should apply under the third
prong of the Central Hudson test.
Later that same term, however, the Court returned to its deferential
style of analysis in United States v. Edge Broadcasting.'°5 In Edge
97. Id. at 417.
98. Id. at 416-17 n.12 & n.13.
99. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 417, n.13.
100. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
101. Id. The Board argued that the ban was necessary to preserve the "attest function"
in which the CPA renders his opinions on the financial status of a business. Id The Board
believed that a CPA who solicits clients is one that "is in need of business and may be willing
to bend the rules." Id. at 765. In applying the test the Court held that, while this interest was
substantial, the state failed to offer studies or anecdotal evidence that demonstrates that the
regulation directly advances its interest in protecting potential clients from deception or un-
scrupulous accountants. Id. at 771. Consequently, the ban was found to be unconstitutional.
Id. at 772.
102. Id. at 770-71.
103. See id. (emphasis added).
104. Id.
105. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
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Broadcasting, the Court upheld a federal statute that banned television
and radio broadcasters from advertising state lotteries if the lotteries
were illegal in the state in which the television or radio broadcaster was
licensed."°6 In applying the Central Hudson factors, the Court com-
pletely ignored the monumental revisions it had made just a few months
earlier in Edenfield and Discovery Network. Contrary to Edenfield, but
similar to Posadas, the Court in Edge accepted the government's argu-
ment without relying on a great deal of demonstrable evidence.
Furthermore, the Court disregarded the broadcaster's argument that
the regulation did not directly advance the State's interest in protecting
its citizens when it said that the third prong "cannot be answered by
limiting the inquiry to whether the governmental interest is directly ad-
vanced as applied to a single person or entity."' ' Under the fourth
prong, the Court had "no doubt that the fit in this case was a reasonable
one. ' ms The Edge Broadcasting decision is a prime example of how the
Court is able to mold and shape the vague language of the Central Hud-
son test in order to arrive at the desired result.1' 9
106. Edge Broadcasting Company operates a radio station licensed by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) in North Carolina. l at 424. The station is approxi-
mately three miles from the border between Virginia and North Carolina. Id. Over 92% of
the station's audience lived in Virginia and 95% of its advertising revenue came from Vir-
ginia advertisers. I& While Virginia operated a widely publicized lottery, North Carolina
did not. Id Because North Carolina does not have a state lottery, FCC regulations (Title 18
U.S.C. §§1304, 1307 (1988 Supp. III)) prohibited the station from broadcasting Virginia lot-
tery advertisements. Id Edge Broadcasting brought suit to challenge the constitutional va-
lidity of the regulations. Id.
107. l at 427. The Court focused on the legislative history behind the FCC regulations
and stressed the importance of protecting a state's decision of whether or not to institute a
state-run lottery. Id. at 424-25, 436. The Court believed that protecting state's rights was the
substantial interest at issue in this case and protecting the individual citizens was secondary.
Furthermore, in response to the argument that the regulation did not directly advance
the asserted interest because North Carolina residents were inundated by lottery advertise-
ments from other sources that were not being regulated, the Court stated that the third prong
did not require that the Government make progress on every front before it can
make progress on any front. If there is an immediate connection between adver-
tising and demand, and the federal regulation decreases advertising, it stands to
reason that the policy of decreasing demand for gambling is correspondingly ad-
vanced.
Id. at 434.
108. Id at 429.
109. The flaws in the Court's analysis become more apparent when it is read with the
Bigelow decision. In Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), the Court said that the state
cannot restrict a citizen's behavior as he travels into another state to engage in legal activi-
ties. Id. at 824-25.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:873
B. 1994-95 Decisions
In the following term, the Court heard two more commercial speech
cases. In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., ° the Court was asked to address
the constitutionality of a federal regulation that prohibited beer manu-
facturers from displaying alcohol content on malt beverage labels."'
While the Court recognized that protection against "strength wars" was
a substantial interest, it unanimously struck down the regulation be-
cause it was "irrational" and did not "directly and materially advance
the government's interest."1
12
While the case ultimately was decided under the third prong, the
Court also said the regulation did not satisfy the fourth prong because
the government failed to pursue the numerous alternative methods that
would have more directly addressed the potential risks associated with
strength wars without prohibiting speech."' The Court held that "the
availability of these options, all of which could advance the govern-
ment's interest in a manner less intrusive to respondent's First Amend-
ment rights, indicates that [the labeling restriction] is more extensive
than necessary.""
4
110. 514 U.S. 476 (1995)
111. lat at 480. Section 5(e)(2) of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act prohibits
any producer, importer, wholesaler, or bottler of alcoholic beverages from selling, shipping,
or delivering any malt beverages, distilled spirits, or wines in bottles unless they conform
with the regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. ld One of these require-
ments was that, unless required by state law, alcohol content could not be printed on the la-
bels of malt beverages (Le. all beers and ales). Ia- The primary goal behind this regulation
was to curb "strength wars" by brewers who might seek to compete for customers on the ba-
sis of alcohol content. Id. at 483. Coors filed suit to challenge the regulation after the Bu-
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms refused to approve labels and advertisements that
included the beverage's alcohol content. lId at 478-79.
112. Id at 488. First, the Court was troubled by the fact that the regulation did not im-
pose the same restrictions on the advertising of the malt beverages. lId Whereas the laws
governing the printing of labels prohibit the disclosure of alcohol content unless such disclo-
sure is required by state law, the regulations prohibiting statements of alcohol content in ad-
vertising only applied to those states that affirmatively prohibit such advertisements. Id
Because only 18 states had such laws, the Court found that the regulation did not directly
advance its interest, particularly in light of the fact that advertising would seem to constitute
a more influential weapon than labels in protecting against the outbreak of strength wars. Id
Second, the Court did not see the logic in requiring the disclosure of alcohol content on the
labels of wine and distilled spirits while prohibiting the same disclosure on the labels of malt
beverages, if the ultimate objective was to combat strength wars. Id
113. Idt at 490-91., The Court listed "several alternatives, such as directly limiting the
alcohol content of beers, prohibiting marketing efforts emphasizing high alcohol strength, or
limiting the labeling ban only to malt liquors, which is the segment of the market that alleg-
edly is threatened with a strength war." Id
114. Id at 491.
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The Rubin decision is significant for three reasons. First, rather
than simply deferring to the government's judgment, the Court was be-ginning to require that the government investigate and implement less
restrictive alternatives before deciding to regulate speech."' Second,
the Court held that it was no longer going to adhere to the deferential
approach outlined in Posadas. In a footnote, Justice Thomas rejected
the assertion that, after Posadas and Edge Broadcasting, there was an
exception to the Central Hudson standard that would allow legislatures
"broader latitude to regulate speech that promotes socially harmful ac-
tivities, such as alcohol consumption," gambling, and the like.116 Third,
Justice Thomas also declined to perpetuate the notion that the "greater-
includes-the lesser" language should be regarded as binding authority. 7
This theory that the government had the ability to ban advertising of a
product if it had the ability to ban the product or service being adver-
tised was merely dicta."' Similar to the reasoning set forth in Edenfield,
the Court's analysis in Rubin represented a significant departure from
the highly deferential analysis outlined in prior decisions. These deci-
sions signified an apparent movement toward affording commercial
speech greater protection.
However, as expected, the Court followed up this highly anti-
paternalistic decision with a pro-paternalistic decision later that same
term.' In Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,'20 the Court reviewed a
Florida regulation that prohibited attorneys from sending targeted
mailings to victims for the first thrity days following an accident or a
disaster." In a 5-4 decision, Justice O'Connor upheld the regulation
115. Id.
116. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476,482 n.2. In other words, the Court was
unwilling to create a subcategory within the commercial speech doctrine that is entitled to
less constitutional protection than traditional commercial speech messages because the
product or service involved is considered a "vice."
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. The terms "pro-paternalistic" and "anti-paternalistic" were applied by Mr. Martin
Redish to distinguish between cases in which the Court did and did not defer to the legisla-
ture's beliefs as to what was in the best interests of its residents. Martin H. Redish, Tobacco
Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 589, 611-617 (1996).
120. 515 U.S. 618 (1995). This case is the most recent in a long series of cases concern-
ing lawyer advertising. For a detailed discussion on the lawyer advertising aspect of the
commercial speech doctrine, see Ronald D. Rotunda, Professionalism, Legal Advertising,
and Freedom of Speech in the Wake of Florida Bar v. Went For It. Inc., 49 ARK. L. REV. 703
(1997) and Paul A. Wilson, Can I Say That in This Advertisement?, Twenty Years of Attorney
Advertising, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 409 (1997).
121. Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 620-21. Florida Bar asserted that it has a substantial inter-
est in protecting the privacy and tranquillity of the accident victims and their loved ones
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because the Florida Bar provided compelling evidence of how the 30-
day moratorium directly advanced the State's interest in protecting vic-
tims and their families.1' The Court was also satisfied that the regula-
tion was no more extensive than necessary because, while it regulated
targeted mailings, it did not prohibit attorneys from resorting to other
alternative forms of advertising."
While the Court insisted that the fourth prong did not require that
the "least restrictive means" be implemented, its decisions in Discovery
Network, Rubin, and Florida Bar appeared to apply that "probing" level
of judicial scrutiny."4 The Court's shift toward this heightened level of
scrutiny would become even more evident in the 1995-96 term with its
decision in 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island.'2
IV. THE 44 LIQUORMART V. RHODE ISLAND DECISION
A. The Facts and Procedural History
The 44 Liquormart decision involved two Rhode Island statutes that
prohibited the price advertising of alcoholic beverages.1" The purpose
of the statutes was to protect the health and welfare of Rhode Island
residents by promoting temperance in the consumption of alcohol."z
The State believed that, if it allowed price advertising, retailers would
lower their prices in order to be competitive and this would result in
during a period of grief and trauma. Id at 624. It also protects the reputation and dignity of
the legal profession that was undermined in the eyes of the public by this form of solicitation.
Id. at 625.
122. In contrast to Edenfield, the petitioner in this case submitted a 106-page summary
of a two year study that it had conducted on the affect of direct lawyer solicitations. Id at
626. The summary included statistical and anecdotal evidence that supported the Florida
Bar's views regarding the potential harm associate with direct mail solicitations. Id. at 626-
27.
123. "Our lawyer advertising cases have afforded lawyers a great deal of leeway to de-
vise innovative ways to attract new business." Id at 633. The State of Florida permits attor-
neys to advertise on prime-time television, the radio, billboards, newspapers, and, the yellow
pages. Id at 633-34. The Court determined that these represented ample alternative chan-
nels for lawyers to disseminate their advertisements.
124. Redish, supra note 119, at 623.
125. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
126. Id at 488-90. The first statute made it illegal for in-state vendors and out-of-state
manufacturers, wholesalers, and shippers to advertise, in any form whatsoever, the price of
alcoholic beverages, with the exception of displays and price tags that were not visible out-
side the establishment. Id (citing R. I. GEN. LAWS §3-8-7 (1987). The second statute pro-
hibited the media from publishing or broadcasting advertisements that made "reference to
the prices of any alcoholic beverages." Id (citing to R. I. GEN. LAWS § 3-8-8.1 (1987)).
127. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 490-91.
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higher alcohol consumption by Rhode Island residents. Therefore, the
State prohibited all forms of off-site price advertising of alcoholic bev-
erages.
In 1991, 44 Liquormart, a retail liquor store, placed an advertise-
ment in the local newspaper which alluded to its low prices on alcoholic
beverages.'8 The Rhode Island Liquor Control Administrator held a
hearing and determined that the advertisement violated the statutes,
fined 44 Liquormart $400, and ordered the retailer to cease running the
advertisement. 29 After paying the fine, 44 Liquormart along with Peo-
ples Super Liquor Stores, Inc., a Massachusetts retail liquor chain with
Rhode Island customers, filed an action in federal district court seeking
a declaratory judgment on the constitutional validity of the two stat-
utes.m
The District Court found the two statutes to be unconstitutional.
13
'
In applying the Central Hudson balancing test as modified by the Eden-
field and Rubin decisions, the Court concluded that the advertising ban
failed to directly and materially advance the State's interest in limiting
alcohol consumption and was "more extensive than necessary to serve
that interest. ' , 2 The Court also rejected the argument that the Twenty-
first Amendment somehow reduced the State's burden of demonstrat-
ing that the prohibition satisfied the Central Hudson factors."
On appeal, the First Circuit applied a Posadas style of analysis in re-
versing the District Court's decision.34 It found "inherent merit" in the
State's argument that a ban would decrease competitive pricing, thereby
driving up prices and reducing alcohol consumption.'35 The Court of
Appeals also found merit in an earlier decision by the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court 6 which held that the Twenty-first Amendment grants the
individual states the ability to regulate the sale and advertising of alco-
hol. In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
issue of whether the price advertising ban was constitutionally valid."
128. While the advertisement did not specifically state the price of any alcoholic bever-
ages, it contained pictures of rum and vodka bottles, along with other non-alcoholic products
(Le., snacks and mixers), and the word "WOW" next to the bottles. Ida at 492.
129. Id. at 493.
130. Id- at 492.
131. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Racine, 829 F. Supp. 543,549,554 (D.R.I. 1993)
132. Id at 555.
133. Id.
134. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 39 F.3d 5,7 (1st Cir. 1994).
135. Id at 7.
136. S&S Liquormart, Inc. v. Pastore, 497 A.2d 729 (R.I. 1985).




The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the First Circuit's deci-
sion to uphold the Rhode Island ban as well as its decision that the
Twenty-first Amendment somehow supersedes the First Amendment
mandate against speech restrictions. The Court, however, was far from
unanimous as to why the Rhode Island ban on alcohol price advertising
violated the First Amendment. There were four separate opinions writ-
ten on this issue, each of which is addressed below.
1. The Plurality Opinion of Justice Stevens
After summarizing the facts and procedural history of the case, Jus-
tice Stevens began the principal opinion by providing an overview of
the commercial speech doctrine."# He recognized that the public's keen
interest in receiving accurate information meant that certain regulations
on commercial speech were warranted. This regulation, he believed,
was justified by the commonsense distinctions between commercial and
noncommercial speech."' While Justice Stevens recognized the need to
regulate or restrict speech that may be deceptive or exert an undue in-
fluence, he believed, as did some of his colleagues in Central Hudson,
that special concerns arise regarding those "regulations that entirely
suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-related
policy."' 4 It was the Court's decision in Central Hudson that these
blanket restrictions be reviewed with "special care.,1 41
However, unlike the members of the Central Hudson majority, Jus-
tice Stevens elaborated on the meaning of this "special care" standard.' 42
Rather than applying the same degree of judicial scrutiny to all com-
mercial speech restrictions, 43 Justice Stevens believed that there should
be two levels of scrutiny depending upon the scope and purpose of the
speech restrictions. Specifically, he believed that restrictions designed
to protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales
tactics should remain subject to intermediate scrutiny, while a more rig-
orous level of scrutiny should be applied when the government com-
138. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. 484, 496-500 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). Justices
Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens in Part III of the opinion.
139. Id. at 498-99.
140. Id. at 499-500 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980)). Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens in
Part IV of the opinion.





pletely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commer-
cial speech for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining
process.'"
Justice Stevens offered three reasons for why this heightened level
of scrutiny was necessary. First, blanket prohibitions are dangerous be-
cause they all but foreclose the alternative channels of disseminating
certain types of information.'" Second, these bans tend to conceal an
underlying governmental policy that could be advanced just as effec-
tively without regulating speech.1" Finally, blanket bans usually rest on
the assumption that the public will respond irrationally to the truth, and
Justice Stevens was particularly skeptical of government attempts to
serve consumers' best interests by keeping them ignorant about a prod-
uct or service."4 Therefore, regardless of commercial speech's supposed
"hardiness" and "greater objectivity," Justice Stevens believed that
blanket bans on truthful, nonmisleading speech should be subject to a
more stringent level of scrutiny than the traditional intermediate scru-
tiny; it should be subject to strict scrutiny.'"
In Part V of the opinion, Justice Stevens determined that the Rhode
Island ban should be subject to this more stringent "special care" analy-
sis because (1) it completely prohibited the dissemination of "truthful,
nonmisleading speech about a lawful product," and (2) it serves an in-
terest "unrelated to consumer protection.' 49  While the first three
prongs remain the same under this "special care" analysis, the fourth
prong of the test would be revised to require that the least restrictive
means be utilized to achieve the governmental interest.
In applying the test to the facts, Justice Stevens was satisfied that the
regulated expression was truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech
about a lawful product and that Rhode Island had a substantial interest
in promoting temperance.' However, in applying the third prong, Jus-
tice Stevens agreed with the district court's determination that the ban
failed to directly and materially advance the State's interest in limiting
144. 44 Liquormart Inc., v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. at 501.
145. Iai at 502.
146. Id. at 502-04.
147. Id
148. Id.
149. Id. at 503. Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens in this
portion (Part V) of the opinion.
150. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. at 508 (1996) (citing Central Hudson




alcohol consumption.'52 While Justice Stevens conceded that the price
advertising ban may have some effect on the purchasing patterns of a
small percentage of Rhode Island citizens, he did not believe that the
state presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the ban would
significantly decrease market-wide consumption."' Contrary to the
First Circuit Court of Appeals, Justice Stevens was unwilling to engage
in "speculation or conjecture" regarding the ban's role in promoting
temperance." 4
In applying the traditional fourth prong, Justice Stevens concluded
that Rhode Island failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a
"reasonable fit" between the price advertising ban and its interest in
promoting temperance.'55 Justice Stevens recognized that there were
several less burdensome alternatives-such as directly regulating the
price of alcohol, imposing a higher tax on alcohol, and creating educa-
tional campaigns focused on the dangers associated with alcohol con-
sumption-that would have more effectively reduced consumption than
a blanket ban on price advertising 56 Consequently, because the ban
could not survive the traditional Fox "reasonable fit" standard, Justice
Stevens found it unnecessary to apply the more rigorous "least restric-
tive means" standard.
57
In Part VI of the opinion, Justice Stevens followed Justice Thomas'
lead5 . in erasing Posadas and its highly deferential analysis from the
commercial speech landscape.'59 Justice Stevens stated that after ten
years of reflection, he now was persuaded that the majority in Posadas
"erroneously performed the First Amendment analysis" when it upheld
the Puerto Rican casino advertising ban."W In particular, he believed
that the majority "clearly erred in concluding that it was 'up to the leg-
152. Id. at 504-06.
153. Id.
154. ld. at 506-08. Justice Stevens believed that engaging in "speculation and conjec-
ture" regarding the affect that a regulation will have is "an unacceptable means of demon-
strating that a restriction.., directly advances the State's asserted interest." Id. at 508
(citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,770 (1993)).
155. Id.
156. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. at 506-08 (1996).
157. 1&
158. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. at 482 n.2 (1994).
159. 44 Liquornart. 517 U.S. at 509-10. Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg
joined Justice Stevens in this portion (Part VI) of the opinion.
160. Id. Relying on Justice Rehnquist's application of the third prong in Posadas,
Rhode Island argued that, because expert testimony regarding the effectiveness of the ban
was inconclusive either way, the ban constituted a "reasonable choice." Id.
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islature' to choose suppression over a less speech-restrictive policy.1161
The Posadas style of reasoning "cannot be reconciled with the unbro-
ken line of prior cases striking down similarly broad regulations on
truthful, nonmisleading advertising when non-speech-related alterna-
tives were available."'62 As a result, the Stevens plurality declined to
give further support to its highly deferential analysis.'63
Justice Stevens also followed Justice Thomas"'1 lead in formally re-
jecting the "greater-includes-the-lesser" argument.6  Justice Stevens
noted that this reasoning was merely dicta and only offered after the
majority had already determined, albeit incorrectly, that the Puerto Ri-
can ban satisfied the Central Hudson factors.'0 Justice Stevens believed
that this type of reasoning should be rejected as "inconsistent with both
logic and well-settled doctrine."'1 67
Finally, by again relying on the Rubin decision, Justice Stevens dis-
missed the State's assertion that, under the Posadas and Edge Broad-
casting decisions, its price advertising ban should be permitted because
it targets commercial speech that involves a "vice" activity.'6 Justice
Stevens believed that it would be difficult to define and enforce a "vice"
exception to the commercial speech doctrine because
Almost any product that poses some threat to public health or
public morals might reasonably be characterized by a state leg-
islature as relating to "vice activity." Such characterization,
however, is anomalous when applied to products such as alco-
holic beverages, lottery tickets, or playing cards, that may be
lawfully purchased on the open market. The recognition of such
161. Id
162. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. at 509-10 (1996).
163. Id. Justice Stevens stated that, "in keeping with our prior holdings, we conclude
that a state legislature does not have the broad discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading
information for paternalistic purposes that the Posadas majority was willing to tolerate." Id
164. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 482 n.2.
165. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 510. In Posadas, Justice Rehnquist concluded his ma-jority opinion by stating that "the greater power to completely ban casino gambling neces-
sarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling." Id. (citing Posadas
de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. at 345-46). On the basis of this reasoning, Rhode
Island argued that its "undisputed authority to ban alcoholic beverages" must also include
the power to restrict the advertising of alcoholic beverages. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 510.
166. Id.
167. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. at 510-11. In analyzing the "greater-
includes-the-lesser" syllogism, Justice Stevens disagreed with Justice Rehnquist's conclusion
in Posadas that along with the greater power to ban the product was the lesser power to ban
speech about the product. Id. Justice Stevens found the power to ban speech to be much
more compelling and dangerous than the ability to ban the product or service. Id.
168. Id. at 511.
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an exception would have the unfortunate consequence of either
allowing state legislatures to justify censorship by the simple ex-
pedient of placing the vice label on selected lawful activities, or
requiring the federal courts to establish a federal common law of
vice. For these reasons, a "vice" label that is unaccompanied by
a corresponding prohibition against the commercial behavior at
issue fails to provide a principled justification for the regulation
of commercial speech about that activity.169
2. The Concurring Opinion of Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Souter,
and Breyer
While Justice O'Connor agreed that the Rhode Island ban was un-
constitutional, she did not share Justice Steven's desire to formulate a
new analytical scheme for evaluating commercial speech regulations.170
She was content to decide the case under the traditional Central Hud-
son factors. In applying the test, Justice O'Connor found that the ban
satisfied the first three prongs, but not the fourth.171 In her opinion, the
fit between the State's price advertising ban and its goal to promote
temperance was not reasonable.7 2 Similar to Justice Stevens, Justice
O'Connor believed that Rhode Island overlooked other methods-such
as establishing minimum prices or imposing a higher sales tax-that
would have more directly promoted temperance than prohibiting the
dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading information. 3
While not nearly as adamant as some of her colleagues, Justice
O'Connor also found the Posadas style of analysis to be outdated."
Justice O'Connor held that since Posadas, "this Court has examined
more searchingly the State's professed goal, and the speech restriction
put into place to further it, before accepting a State's claim that the
speech restriction satisfies First Amendment scrutiny."'' 5 Under this
"closer look" approach, the Court would no longer defer to the State's
proffered justification for its regulation. Rather, the State must show
that the speech restriction directly advances its asserted interest and
169. Id. at 512-16 (citations omitted).
170. Id. at 528-32.
171. Id. at 529.
172. Id.
173. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. at 530-31. In addition to pursuing
direct regulation, Justice O'Connor also believed that educational programming was prefer-
able to banning speech. Id.
174. Id. at 531-32.
175. Id. at 531.
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that it is narrowly tailored. 7
3. The Concurring Opinion of Justice Thomas
Finding the Central Hudson test difficult to apply consistently, Jus-
tice Thomas was prepared to abandon the last three prongs of the test
in favor of a more strict one-step inquiry.' Justice Thomas believed
that in situations where "the government's asserted interest is to keep
legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their
choices in the marketplace," the Central Hudson test provides insuffi-
cient protection.' 78 He viewed paternalistic regulations of truthful,
nonmisleading speech as per se illegitimate, and believed that they
should be reviewed under a stricter level of scrutiny.Y
7 9
Justice Thomas also was particularly interested in the fact that Jus-
tice Stevens and Justice O'Connor appeared to adopt a stricter interpre-
tation of the fourth prong. 8" While Justice Thomas applauded his col-
leagues implicit desire to afford commercial speech greater
protection, 8' he failed to see why they did not simply bypass the fourth
prong analysis completely in favor of striking down all regulations that
seek to suppress truthful, nonmisleading speech about lawful prod-
ucts."a Justice Thomas reasoned that a stricter application of the fourth
prong (i.e., a least restrictive means approach) would be virtually im-
possible for governments to overcome because directly restricting con-
duct would always be less burdensome than restricting speech. There-
fore, it was an unnecessary inquiry.'"
Justice Thomas concluded his concurrence by denouncing the Cen-
tral Hudson test as inherently inconsistent. In doing so, he urged his
colleagues to return to the broad protection that was afforded commer-
cial speech under Virginia Phannacy."4
176. Id- at 531-32.
177. Id. at 518-20 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas would have saved the first
prong of the test and required only that the expression be truthful, nonmisleading speech
about a lawful product. Id.
178. See id. at 523.
179. 44 Liquromart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. at 525-528 (1996).
180. id at 524-25.
181. Im. at 525.
182. Id. at 526.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 527-28.
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4. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia shared Justice Thomas' trepidations regarding the
continued use of the Central Hudson balancing test."5 However, unlike
Justice Thomas and Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia was not prepared to
declare the Central Hudson test "wrong."'" While ultimately deciding
the case under the Central Hudson factors, Justice Scalia warned future
litigants that he was "not disposed to develop new law, or reinforce
old."' 7 Justice Scalia's somewhat middle-of-the-road concurrence is
important because, while other members of the Court seem entrenched
in their views, his open-minded approach may mean that he will cast the
deciding vote in future commercial speech cases.
C. Implications of 44 Liquormart
While the Court's opinion in 44 Liquormart was disjointed and hard
to reconcile, there are several conclusions that can be drawn from it.
First, the Twenty-First Amendment does not qualify the First Amend-
ment's prohibition against state laws that abridge an individual's free-
dom of speech."' Second, although at least six members of the Court
appeared ready to discard all or parts of the traditional Central Hudson
balancing test in 44 Liquormart, the test remains the threshold standard
for reviewing legislation that restricts the dissemination of commercial
speech.
Justice Stevens 189 and Justice Thomas"9 each proposed implement-
ing a more stringent level of judicial scrutiny when the government at-
tempts to preclude the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading com-
mercial speech about lawful products or services in order to keep legal
users of a product ignorant so as to manipulate their choices in the mar-
ketplaces; however, neither proposition received majority support. The
survival of the existing Central Hudson standard was due to Justice
O'Connor's belief that the facts of the case did not warrant changing the
current balancing test. 9 Her statement, however, leaves open the pos-
sibility that a fact pattern may present itself that justifies revising all or
185. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Scalia considered the test "to have nothing more than policy intuition to support it." l
186. See id
187. Id
188. Id. at 514-16.
189. Id at 501; see supra footnotes 138-169 and accompanying text.
190. Id at 518-23; see supra footnotes 176-183 and accompanying text.
191. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. at 528-32; see supra footnotes 170-
175 and accompanying text.
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part of the four-part balancing test.
Finally, the Court rejected the continued reliance on Posadas and its
overly deferential method of analysis.'9 While the 1986 decision was
not formally overruled, both pluralities agreed that it was no longer a
viable First Amendment authority. In rejecting the deferential ap-
proach, the Court also discarded both the "greater-includes-the-lesser"
theory and the idea that there was a "vice" category within the com-
mercial speech doctrine that entitled advertising of gambling, alcohol,
and tobacco products less constitutional protection than other forms of
commercial speech.193
D. The Aftermath
Although the 44 Liquormart decision was regarded as a significant
victory that was bound to elevate commercial speech's status within the
First Amendment hierarchy,' two subsequent lower court decisions
called into question whether commercial speech was in a better position
after 44 Liquormart than it was previously. In 1995, the Fourth Circuit
issued a pair of decisions concerning two Baltimore City ordinances that
banned all stationary outdoor advertising of tobacco and alcohol prod-
ucts except in certain areas of the city.95 Relying exclusively on Edge
Broadcasting, Florida Bar, and Posadas, the Court found that both or-
dinances satisfied all four prongs of the Central Hudson balancing test.
It completely ignored the Edenfield heightened evidentiary requirement
and decided that a "logical nexus" between the ordinances and the
city's interests was all that was necessary to satisfy the third prong.9 '
192. Id. at 508-11 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion), 528 (O'Connor, J., concurring on
judgment); see also supra notes 138-169 and 170-175 and accompanying text.
193. Id. at 508-11.
194. David 0. Stewart, Change Brewing In Commercial Speech, 82 A.B.A. J. 44 (July
1996).
195. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 855 F. Supp. 811 (D.Md. 1994), aff'd,
63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter "Anheuser-Busch P'], Penn Advertising of Balti-
more, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 862 F. Supp. 1402 (D.Md. 1994), afftd, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th
Cir. 1995) [hereinafter "Penn Advertising I"]. The regulation at issue in Anheuser-Busch I
was Baltimore Ordinance 288, which prohibited all stationary outdoor advertising of alco-
holic beverages except in certain commercially and industrially zoned areas of the city. An-
heuser-Busch 1, 63 F.3d at 1308-09. The regulation at issue in Penn Advertising I was Balti-
more Ordinance 307, which similarly prohibited all stationary advertising of tobacco
products except in certain commercial and industrial zoned areas of the city. Penn Advertis-
ing 1, 63 F.3d at 1320-21.
196. Anheuser-Busch I, 63 F.3d at 1314. The Court applied the same standards in up-




In deciding that both ordinances were narrowly drawn, the circuit
court determined, without offering any clarification, that there were no
less restrictive means available to advance the government's interest.
197
The circuit court's use of the phrase "least restrictive means" is mis-
leading because it interpreted the fourth prong as follows "[i]f a regula-
tion goes only 'marginally beyond what would adequately have served
the governmental interest,' the regulation will not be invalidated; only
when a regulation is 'substantially excessive, disregarding far less re-
strictive and more precise means' will the regulation be invalidated un-
der this prong of Central Hudson."'98
The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari in both cases,
vacated the Fourth Circuit's opinion, and remanded the cases for fur-
ther consideration in light of the 44 Liquormart decision.19 On remand,
the Fourth Circuit surprised many observers when it declined to reverse
its prior decisions.2 Instead, the circuit court drew several distinctions
between 44 Liquormart and the two lower court cases that it believed
necessitated reaffirming its decisions. First and foremost, the circuit
court emphasized that there was no consensus among the nine Justices
in 44 Liquormart as to why the ban violated the First Amendment20
Without a consensus, the circuit judges recognized that they were only
bound by those portions of the decision in which the majority of the
Justices "concurred on the narrowest grounds."= According to Judge
Niemeyer, the only portion of the decision in which a majority of the
nine Justices concurred was that "keeping legal users of alcoholic bev-
erages ignorant of prices through a blanket ban on price advertising"'
197. Anheuser-Busch 1, 63 F.3d at 1316 and Penn Advertising 1, 63 F.3d at 1325.
198. Anheuser-Busch 1, 63 F.3d at 1315 and Penn Advertising 1, 63 F.3d at 1325.
199. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated
and remanded sub nom. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Schmoke, 116 S. Ct. 1821 (1996), Penn Ad-
vertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated
and remanded sub nom. Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Schmoke, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (4th
Cir.1996).
200. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1996) ["Anheuser-Busch
I" ] Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996) cert ce-
nied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997) ["Penn Advertising I"]. Because the Fourth Circuit's rationale
for reaffirming both cases is contained almost exclusively in the Anheuser-Busch 11 decision,
the following discussion will cite only to that opinion.
201. Anheuser-Busch 11, 101 F.3d. at 328.
202 IL (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). In Marks, the Court
held that "when a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that posi-
tion taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds."'
Anheuser-Busch If, 101 F.3d at 328 (quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193).
203. See Anheuser-Busch I1, 101 F.3d at 329. Judge Niemeyer, however, failed to real-
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violates the First Amendment.
Judge Niemeyer pointed out that while Rhode Island enacted a
blanket ban on all forms of off-site price advertising in order to dis-
suade legal users from consuming alcohol, Baltimore's ordinances
merely were time, place, and manner restrictions that were narrowly
targeted at preventing non-legal users (i.e. minors) from consuming al-
cohol or tobacco products.2 Moreover, unlike Rhode Island's blanket
ban, the Baltimore ordinances did not foreclose all channels that the pe-
titioners could use to disseminate their messages.2
Judge Niemeyer further contrasted the cases by pointing out that
neither Baltimore nor the State of Maryland was "attempting to un-
dermine democratic processes and circumvent public scrutiny by substi-
tuting a ban on advertising for a ban on the product, as the 44 Liquor-
mart Court feared was the case with Rhode Island." ' Rather,
Baltimore was utilizing the ordinances to reinforce existing laws that
banned the consumption of alcohol and tobacco products by minors.2
Rhode Island also banned price advertising in an effort "to enforce
adult temperance through an artificial budgetary constraint."= Balti-
more, in contrast, sought "to protect children who are not yet inde-
pendently able to assess the value of the message presented." In addi-
tion, it was not attempting to prohibit adults from purchasing alcohol or
tobacco products.0 Based on these facts, Judge Niemeyer concluded
that the decision should be reaffirmed because it "conforms to the Su-
preme Court's repeated recognition that children deserve special solici-
tude in the First Amendment balance because they lack the ability to
assess and analyze fully the information presented through commercial
media. ,21
0
ize that a majority of the nine Justices also agreed that Posadas, the decision that the Fourth
Circuit relied upon in deciding Anheuser-Busch I and Penn Advertising I, was no longer
binding authority. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. In contrast to the Rhode Island ban, the Baltimore ordinances did not bar peti-
tioners from resorting to newspapers, magazines, radio, direct mail, Internet, and other me-
dia sources. Id.




209. Id. at 329.
210. Id. (citing Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct 2374,
2386 (1996); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747,759 (1982); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,750-51 (1978); Stanley v. Georgia,
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In his dissent, Judge Butzner said that he would have vacated the
district court decision and remanded the case to the lower court for an
evidentiary hearing concerning the link between banning billboards and
reducing underage consumption of alcohol or tobacco products. 21  He
stated that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to properly evaluate
whether the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson had been met.212
In both sets of decisions, the Fourth Circuit summarily disregarded
Edenfield's mandate that courts not defer to the legislature's conjecture
about a regulation's effectiveness. Instead of inquiring into whether the
ordinances directly and materially advanced Baltimore's interest in re-
ducing underage consumption of tobacco and alcohol products, the cir-
cuit court simply accepted the city's position that the partial outdoor
advertising ban would significantly reduce the use of these products by
minors.
When courts fail to make a careful, searching inquiry into whether
or not the regulation satisfies the third prong, it typically fails to do the
same under the fourth prong. This was a problem in the aforemen-
tioned cases as well. The Fourth Circuit failed to determine whether
the bans were narrowly tailored or whether less speech restrictive alter-
natives existed to reduce consumption. 3 In effect, the Fourth Circuit
394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969); Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968); Prince v. Mas-
sachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944)).
211. Id. at 330 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
212 Id at 331. "A charge that advertising restrictions infringe rights guaranteed by the
First Amendment requires careful evaluation assessing the credibility of witnesses and
weighing the evidence. These functions should be performed by a judge-not by a city coun-
cil." Anheuser Busch II, 107 F.3d 325, 332 (4th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, contrary to the
other members of the panel, Judge Butzner also correctly stated that a majority of the 44
Liquormart Court expressly decided to no longer support Posadas and its deferential analy-
sis. Id. at 331-32. This is significant because, in deciding Anheuser-Busch I and Penn Adver-
tising 1, this same panel relied on Posadas' deferential analysis to support its decision to up-
hold the billboard bans. Id. Therefore, by reaffirming these prior decisions in Anheuser-
Busch II and Penn Advertising H, the Court defiantly disregarded the Court's rejection of
Posadas. Id.
213. The Court's perfunctory application of the Central Hudson test in these cases is
significant because it has been the impetus behind the enactment of similar billboard restric-
tions across the nation. For example, Richmond, California banned tobacco advertisement
on billboards within 500 feet of elementary and secondary schools, and King County, Wash-
ington banned tobacco advertising in all county-owned buildings. See Donald W. Garner &
Richard J. Whitney, Protecting Children From Joe Camel and His Friends: A New First
Amendment and Federal Preemption Analysis of Tobacco Billboard Regulation, 46 EMORY
LJ. 479,487-489 (1997). Cincinnati limits outdoor tobacco advertising signs to certain areas.
Other cities have banned tobacco ads on public transit systems, including New York; Syra-
cuse; Seattle; Portland; San Francisco; Alameda, Santa Clara, and Contra Costa Counties
(California); Denver; Boston; Amherst; Springfield (Massachusetts), and Madison
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seriously undermined the recent advances made by the Supreme Court
to reinforce the Central Hudson test because it disregarded both re-
quirements that the speech restrictions directly advance the govern-
ment's asserted interest and that it constitute a reasonable fit.214
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to review the Baltimore or-
dinances, but it declined to do so.215 One commentator offered the fol-
lowing rationales for why the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the
two Baltimore billboard cases. 1' First, the commercial speech doctrine
"is still in a state of flux, and the Court is unwilling to clarify its position
at this time., 217 Second, there currently is no disagreement among the
circuits that the Court needs to resolve.2"8 Third, the Court might be
waiting for a decision from another circuit that, supports the Court's
reasoning in 44 Liquormart and then use it to resolve any split with the
Fourth Circuit's position.1 9 Finally, this commentator posits that the
Court has already granted certiorari on eight commercial speech cases
in the last four years, and it should not be expected to decide a com-
mercial speech case every term.m
Whatever the Court's reasoning, it passed up a golden opportunity
to develop and solidify its protective holding in 44 Liquormart, and, at
the same time, eliminate some of the confusion surrounding commercial
speech. As a result, unless presented with a blanket ban on commercial
speech, the doctrine remains as perplexing as it was prior to 44 Liquor-
mart.
V. REVISING THE FOURTH PRONG
While the members of the Court were unable to agree on many is-
(Wisconsin). IL
214. Felix H. Kent, Reviewing 1997: Tobacco Settlemen4 N.Y. L. J. 3 (12/19/97).
215. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated
and remanded sub nom. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Schmoke, 116 S. Ct. 1821 (1996), reaffd, 101
F.3d. 325 (4th Cir. 1996), cerL denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (April 28, 1997) and Penn Advertising
of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated and re-
manded sub nor. Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Schmoke, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996),
reaffd 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997). See also, Edward
Felsenthal and Yumiko Ono, Outdoor Ads for Tobacco Can Be Curbed, THE WALL ST. J.,
April 29, 1997, at B1.
216. See Richard T. Kaplar, Court's Refusal to Hear Baltimore Appeals Sparks Flurry of








sues in 44 Liquormart, they were able to agree that Posadas was no
longer controlling authority. The Posadas decision, which has been the
impetus behind numerous paternalistic regulations in the past decade,
no longer can be used to justify affording commercial speech minimal
constitutional protection. And, because the Fox "reasonable fit" stan-
dard grew out of the Posadas decision, the next logical step would be to
discard this low evidentiary standard in favor of a standard that affords
commercial speech greater protection.
Strengthening the level of protection afforded to commercial speech
could be accomplished by readopting the "least restrictive means stan-
dard." In 44 Liquormart, the Court seemed to move in this direction.
Both the Stevens and O'Connor pluralities, while ultimately applying
the Fox "reasonable fit" standard, focused on the fact that Rhode Island
had several less speech restrictive alternatives available, which were
more likely to advance Rhode Island's goal of promoting temperance.
While Justice Thomas would have adopted the more extreme approach
of eliminating the final three prongs of the test, he recognized that both
Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor appeared to apply a stricter inter-
pretation of the fourth prong, which "would go a long way toward the
position [he would] take." Therefore, assuming that a theoretical com-
promise can be reached, a majority of the Court might be prepared to
readopt the "least restrictive means" standard when applying the fourth
prong.
There are three primary justifications for adopting this more strenu-
ous standard. First, as the aforementioned cases suggest, the reasonable
fit standard allows too much judicial discretion and, consequently, too
many inconsistent results. Second, it creates a disincentive for govern-
ments to investigate and implement non-speech restrictive alternatives
that have the potential to be highly effective. Third, commercial speech
no longer is-if it ever was-deserving of a subordinate position within
the First Amendment hierarchy and is entitled to a broader level of pro-
tection. Each of these concerns will be addressed in turn.
A. Reduce Judicial Discretion and Inconsistent Results
The obvious justification for abandoning the "reasonable fit" stan-
dard is that it leads to inconsistent results."1 A primary reason for these
221. See Leonard M. Niehoff, The Supreme Court Clarifies the Commercial Speech
Doctrine-Again, 75 MICH. B.J. 828 (1996); see also Edward 0. Correia, State and Local
Regulation of Cigarette Advertising, 23 J. LEGIS. 1, 7-8 (1997); Karl Boedecker et al., The
Evolution of First Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech, 59 J. MKTG. 38, 43 (1995).
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inconsistent results is that jurists currently enjoy a high level of discre-
tion under this relaxed "reasonable fit" standard.2m  The lack of clear
guidelines as to what constitutes a "reasonable fit" means that each ju-
rist is permitted great latitude to insert his or her personal views when
reviewing commercial speech regulations. There are no safeguards to
prevent them from relying on either public sentiment or their own indi-
vidual biases about a product or service when determining whether the
government may regulate the advertising of that product or service.m
This high level of discretion means that the advertising and legal com-
munities are left guessing as to their chances for success.'
However, under the "least restrictive means" standard, the level of
arbitrariness in which courts review commercial speech restrictions
would be reduced. In combination with the more rigorous Edenfield
standards, this least restrictive means standard would require that the
courts look for a closer causal nexus between the substantial harm that
the government seeks to restrict and the speech that allegedly will pro-
duce such harm. m This heightened standard would, in effect, create a
rebuttable presumption that favors the free flow of truthful, nonmis-
leading commercial speech.22 This modified prong could only be satis-
Since its adoption of the reasonable fit standard in 1989, the Supreme Court has relied on the
fourth prong to uphold two out of five commercial speech restrictions. In United States v.
Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. 418 (1993), the Court used a watered-down version of the fourth
prong to uphold the lottery broadcasting restriction. In Florida Bar v. Went For It Inc., 515
U.S. 618 (1993), the fourth prong played somewhat of a lesser role in the Court's decision to
uphold the 30-day moratorium. On the other hand, the Court applied a more stringent inter-
pretation of the fourth prong in striking down the government's commercial speech restric-
tions in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 515 U.S. 476 (1995), City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, 507 U.S. 410 (1993) and 44 Liquormart Inc., v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
The fourth prong was not a significant factor in the Court's decisions of Ibanez v. Fla. Dept
of Bus. & Prof Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994) or Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
Based on these decisions, there is a slightly better than a 50-50 chance that a commercial
speech restriction will be struck down under this reasonable fit standard.
222. WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 62.
223. The "reasonable fit" standard appears to depend more on the subjective views of
the Justices and less on the verifiable evidence offered by the government. The subjective
nature of the "reasonable fit" factor has become increasingly problematic as the lower courts
have been confronted with municipal, state, and federal legislation that seeks to protect mi-
nors from legal, but potentially harmful, products. See Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle
Way: Intermediate Scrutiny As Judicial Minimalism, 66 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 298, 300-02
(1998).
224. See Felix H. Kent, Re-Affirmation of First Amendment in Commercial Speech, N.Y.
L.., Apr. 6, 1993, at 3. Kent states that the protection for commercial speech has been a
"Supreme Court made roller coaster ride" for the legal and advertising community. Id




fled if the government clearly establishes that there are no less speech
restrictive alternatives that would have a comparative impact on fur-
thering the state's asserted interests. 7 By requiring the courts to begin
their review in a light that strongly favors the free flow of truthful,
nonmisleading commercial expression, and not one that allows great
deference to the legislatures, this revision will reduce judicial discretion
and promote predictability.m
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas was skeptical that the "least re-
strictive means" standard would transform the Central Hudson balanc-
ing test into a more speech-protective analytical framework. 2 9 He be-
lieved that because directly regulating a product "would virtually always
be at least as effective in discouraging consumption as [ ] restricting ad-
vertising," all restrictions would fail under this more stringent stan-
dard.' This is not necessarily true.
Granted, this heightened level of scrutiny makes it more difficult to
justify speech restrictions, but it does not make it impossible. The gov-
ernment would not be obligated to use the least speech restrictive alter-
natives if those alternatives already have been implemented and failed
to resolve the problem. For example, a narrow advertising ban (e.g. one
that restricts cigarette billboard advertising within a reasonable distance
of schools, parks, or other areas heavily populated by children) may, in
fact, be the least restrictive method of reducing underage smoking if the
city can demonstrate that underage smoking continues to increase in
spite of: (1) it's rigorous monitoring and enforcement system; (2) its
laws that restrict and severely punish the sale of tobacco products to
minors; and (3) its well-funded anti-smoking educational programs. Of
course, the city would need to demonstrate that the speech restrictions
directly and materially reduce consumption by minors. But if the less
speech restrictive alternatives are not feasible or do not directly and
materially advance the government's objective, then greater restrictions
on advertising may become necessary even under this more protective
standard.
It is important to keep in mind that, under this proposed revision,
governments would be required to implement the most effective meas-
ures that restrict the least amount of speech. Critics may argue that this
227. ld.
228. See generally Paul A. Blechner, First Amendment" Supreme Court Rejection of the
Least Restrictive Alternative Test, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 331 (1991).




is already required under the current "reasonable fit" standard, and in
theory they may be correct. However, as the case law demonstrates,
this has not always been applied in practice. By adopting the "least re-
strictive means" standard, the Court would be required to apply a
stronger presumption in favor of protecting speech than currently exists
under the "reasonable fit" standard.
Critics may also challenge this revision by arguing that this will not
reduce inconsistencies because it is simply the replacement of one
vague and imprecise standard with another. This argument also is not
necessarily accurate. The "least restrictive means" standard has been in
existence for several years and has been applied in numerous contexts.2
However, if the standard still remains elusive, asking the following two
questions should provide additional clarification as to what is required
in order to satisfy this least restrictive means requirment?2 First, is the
governmental regulation narrowly tailored to restrict the least amount
of speech possible while directly and materially advancing its asserted
policy interest? Second, are there feasible alternative policies or tactics
that can accomplish the government's interest just as effectively without
restricting speech? A negative answer to the first inquiry or an affirma-
tive answer to the second inquiry would mean that the speech restric-
tion does not satisfy the "least restrictive means" standard.
B. Promoting Less Speech Restrictive Alternatives
The second rationale for abandoning the "reasonable fit" standard
in favor of the "least restrictive means" standard is that it would force
legislatures to investigate other non-speech restrictive alternatives in
order to further their paternalistic policy goals. The following are three
alternative methods in which governments can further their paternalis-
tic goals without restricting speech: direct regulation, counterspeech,
and self-regulation.
1. Direct Regulation
If a community wishes to reduce the consumption of a certain prod-
uct or service, it would make more sense to regulate the use of that
231. Some of the more recent cases are: Denver Area Education Telecommunication
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996); Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115
(1989); and Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575 (1983).
232. The following questions are modified versions of questions proposed by Mr. Ed-
ward 0. Correia, supra note 221, at 34.
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product or service than to restrict the advertisement of the product23
Justices Stevens and O'Connor agreed that direct regulations on con-
duct would be preferable and more effective than restrictions on
speech. There are at least three tactics that can be used to regulate
conduct. First, the government could reduce demand. The most com-
mon method for reducing the demand for a product or service is to
make the product more expensive by imposing a higher tax on it. Jus-
tice O'Connor stated that a tax "is not normally very difficult to admin-
ister and would have a far more certain and direct effect" than restrict-
ing speech.23 Second, the government could restrict access. For
instance, the government could impose and strictly enforce age restric-
tions, purchase period curfews or impose higher licensing fees to reduce
the number of vendors authorized to sell the product. Finally, the gov-
ernment could enhance the penalties imposed upon those vendors and
consumers who fail to conform with these requirements."5
2. Counterspeech
In addition to regilating conduct, legislatures also could choose to
add to rather than subtract from, the commercial marketplace of
ideas 236 In his concurrence in Virginia Pharmacy, Justice Stewart stated
that the only way that ideas can be suppressed is through "the competi-
tion of other ideas."'' This method is commonly referred to as counter-
speech. Counterspeech gives consumers the ability to weigh the two
competing messages in the context of the individual consumer's eco-
nomic decisionmaking capacity. The purpose of utilizing counter-
speech, however, should not be to impose government-determined ra-
tionality on individuals, but rather to allow the government to provide
consumers with essential information that is necessary when making
important day-to-day decisions.
233. Debra Gersh Hernandez, Tobacco Ad Debate Rages, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Sept.
7, 1996, at 24.
234. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 529-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
235. In San Jose, California, the use of sting operations to catch an punish vendors that
sell to minors has contributed to the thirty percent drop in cigarette sales. Elizabeth Gleick,
Out of the Mouth of Babes, TIME, Aug. 21, 1995, at 33-34.
236. See generally Helen McGee Konrad, Note, Eliminating Distinctions Between
Commercial and Political Speech; Replacing Regulation with Government Counterspeech, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1129 (1990).
237. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 780 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart also stated that "people will
perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and.., the best
means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them." Id
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In the late 1960s, counterspeech proved to be a highly effective tool
in convincing people to quit smoking. 8 In 1967, the Federal Communi-
cations Commission decided that the Fairness Doctrine applied to ciga-
rette advertising. This meant that it was a "controversial issue of [such]
public importance" 39 that broadcasters would be required to donate air
time to anti-smoking organizations. 2'° Soon thereafter, television and
radio stations began carrying advertisements concerning the dangers of
smoking and its causal relationship to lung cancer. 4' While the ratio of
cigarette advertisements to antismoking advertisements was four-to-
one, the message was getting through to consumers. 2 The consumption
of cigarettes declined, and several reports credited the decline to the
anti-smoking ads. 43
Due to the dramatic impact of anti-smoking advertisements on
sales, the tobacco industry decided that it would not challenge the 1969
ban on cigarette advertising because they knew that the advertising
ban eliminated not only cigarette commercials, but the anti-smoking
commercials as well.25 The tobacco industry knew that as soon as the
anti-smoking advertisements stopped, cigarette sales would begin to
rise; they were correct. 246
In the 1990s, counterspeech again has become a highly effective tool
in reducing underage smoking.247 In Vermont, counterspeech programs
have cut teen smoking by thirty-five percent.2 In Massachusetts and in
238. MICHAEL G. GARTNER, ADVERTISING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 30-33
(1989).
239. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082,1086 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
240. Daniel Helberg, Note & Comment, Butt Out" An Analysis of the FDA's Proposed
Restrictions on Cigarette Advertising Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 29 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1219, 1230 n.84 (1996). "The FCC articulated the Fairness Doctrine in 1949 in re-
sponse to a Supreme Court mandate that the FCC, in determining who could broadcast over
the radio, must consider the 'public interest, convenience, or necessity."' Id (citing Roland
F. Hall, The Fairness Doctrine and the First Amendment: Phoenix Rising, 45 MERCER L.
REV. 705, 709 (1994)). See also GARTNER, supra note 238, at 30.
241. See GARTNER, supra note 238, at 30.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. (referring to the "Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969," 15 U.S.C.
§§1331-1341 (1994)).
245. See GARTNER, supra note 238, at 30.
246. Id.
247. See generally David A. Locke, Counterspeech as an Alternative to Prohibition. Pro-
posed Federal Regulation of Tobacco Promotion in American Motorsport, 70 IND. LJ. 217
(1997).
248. Douglas Birch, Antismoking Ads Can Work, Experts Say, THE BALTIMORE SUN,
Aug. 12, 1995, at 1A.
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San Jose, California, government funded anti-smoking advertisements
and programs have contributed to a forty percent decrease in cigarette
sales since 1994."4 These statistics are symbolic of how non-speech re-
strictive alternatives can be highly effective in advancing the govern-
ment's paternalistic goals while respecting the high value commercial
speech has in our society.
3. Self-Regulation
Finally, the advertising industry could adopt a system of self-
regulation.m The concept of self-regulation in advertising began in the
1960s and has since been adopted in fifty-two countries throughout the
world5 1 Canada, for example, has a self-regulatory body comprised of
advertisers, media executives, and members of various consumer asso-
ciations that reviews advertisements and handles public and industry
complaints5 2 In addition to reviewing the advertisements for truth and
accuracy, the Canadian Advertising Foundation also monitors other ar-
eas such as "taste, decency, sexism, and gender portrayal."' '  It is con-
sidered a highly effective and preferable alternative to government-
imposed speech restrictions.'
In the United States, some observers believe that the role of the Na-
tional Advertising Review Council ("NARC") and the National Adver-
tising Bureau of the Council of Better Business Bureaus should be ex-
panded to oversee the more controversial aspects of advertising.55
Currently, these agencies only review advertisements for their truth and
accuracy, but there is growing interest in having it address controversial
issues, such as tobacco and alcohol advertising.56 Members of Congress
and the advertising community believe that new self-regulatory steps
must be taken in the area of alcohol advertising so as to avoid further
249. Gleick, supra note 235, at 34.
250. Rance Crain, Self-Regulation Can Solve Tobacco, Liquor Ad Furor, ADVERTISING
AGE, Dec. 16, 1996. "The beauty of self-regulation is that it eliminates those tricky First
Amendment issues ... If the industry itself were to agree to common-sense restrictions on
cigarette promotions, that voluntary agreement would carry a lot of credibility both with the
public and with the government." Id.
251. Joanne Ingrassia, Regional Focus Canada; Canada's Ad Industry Self-Regulation




255. Both entities are private self-regulatory agencies for certain members of the U.S.
advertising industry. Crain, supra note 250, at 23.
256. Crain, supra note 250, at 23.
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involvement by the Federal Communications Commission or the Fed-
eral Trade Commission.27 These voluntary self-regulations, if adopted
by the advertising community, would ensure that advertisers are truth-
ful, accurate, and responsible to consumers and society as a whole.
The National Advertising Division ("NAD") has begun to parallel
its decisions with those of the Federal Trade Commission and the Food
and Drug Administration.2S NAD also has addressed controversial
questions that have not yet been addressed by the governmental agen-
cies.29 Furthermore, NAD and NARC decisions are published regu-
larly and the handling of these cases greatly resembles formal legal pro-
ceedings, which includes the reliance on established precedents.m
Observers now view self-regulation as a viable and less costly alterna-
tive to going to judicial or administrative adjudication. 1
C. Greater Protection For Commercial Speech
The third rationale for abandoning the "reasonable fit" standard in
favor of the "least restrictive means" standard is that commercial
speech deserves a higher degree of protection than it currently enjoys.
Historically, commercial speech has been viewed as substantially less
valuable than political speech. This distinction is based on the idea that,
unlike political speech, commercial speech is not critical to the mainte-
nance of a viable democracy.2
This justification for affording commercial speech a subordinate po-
sition in the First Amendment hierarchy is flawed because our free
market economic system and our democratic political system are in-
separable m Advertising is as "crucial to our capitalistic ideology as
political speech is to our democratic ideology."2' While commercial
speech "may not affect how people are governed as directly as political
speech does, [ ] it indirectly influences people's attitudes and values
257. Ira Teinowitz, Renewed Call for Self-Regulation, ADVERTISING AGE, Apr. 7, 1997,
at 51.




262. See Jackson & Jeffries, Jr., supra note 28, at 14. Compare Robert Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1 (1971), with Steven Shiffrin,
The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First
Amendment 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212,1216 (1983).
263. See GARTNER, supra note 238, at 9.
264. BURT NEUBORNE, FREE SPEECH, FREE MARKETS, FREE CHOICE 17(1987).
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about how they should be governed." 5 Furthermore, the free flow of
commercial speech allows advertisers and consumers to economize
their time and effort in deciding how to allocate their resources.m For
these reasons, commercial speech is entitled to greater First Amend-
ment protection.
The standard argument over the years for not providing commercial
speech greater protection is that there are "commonsense differences"
between commercial speech and noncommercial speech.2 7 In Virginia
Pharmacy, the Court believed that the existence of these commonsense
differences suggested that a different degree of protection is necessary
in order to properly protect the dissemination of commercial speech.2
These distinctions have been the proverbial albatross around the neck
of commercial speech.
The first of these commonsense distinctions between commercial
and noncommercial speech is that commercial speech is somehow
"more verifiable" than noncommercial speech. 9 Commercial speakers
are viewed as being better informed as to both the economic market-
place and their products.2 0 Hence, they are better situated than a po-
litical speaker "to evaluate the accuracy of their messages and the law-
fulness of the underlying activity."' "l
Even if commercial speech is in fact more verifiable than political
speech, the Court has never explained why the degree of verifiability
should dictate the level of protection speech should receive under the
First Amendment. 2 Perhaps the members of the Court became consti-
tutional conservationists and viewed the First Amendment as some sort
of resource whose value can be spread only so thin before it disappears.
However, even if verifiability was a critical factor in determining the
level of protection to afford a form of speech, there are examples of
when political speech is more verifiable than commercial speech. 2 3 For
265. See GARTNER, supra note 238, at 9. "While politics can shape a man's business, his
business can just as surely shape his politics." Id.
266. GARTNER, supra note 238, at 9.
267. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425




271. Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
564 n.6 (1980) (citations omitted).
272. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L.
REV. 627, 635-37 (1990).
273. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
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example, it would be easier to determine how an incumbent candidate
voted on a certain issue than it would be to accurately determine if
Miller Beer "tastes great" or is "less filling."
The second commonsense distinction is that commercial speech is
hardier or more durable than noncommercial speech.274 The court ex-
plained this distinction as follows: "[S]ince advertising is the sine qua
non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled
by proper regulation foregone entirely."' 5 In other words, the Court
presumed that greed will overcome any chilling effects that may be as-
sociated with commercial speech regulations. This reasoning, similar to
the verifiability distinction, is unsupported. 6 Consequently, because
these commonsense distinctions are unfounded, they should no longer
be used as a justification for affording commercial speech a subordinate
position in the First Amendment hierarchy.2n
VI. CONCLUSION
The 44 Liquormart decision clearly signifies a desire by a majority of
the Court to provide greater constitutional protection for truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech. However, the decision also signifies
the Court's inability to come to a consensus on how that protection
should be provided. This Comment has suggested a revision that can be
viewed as a compromise between the Justice's competing views. It pro-
posed that the Court dispense with the "reasonable fit" standard in fa-
vor of the "least restrictive means" standard under the existing Central
Hudson balancing test.
Under this heightened standard, the level of discretion afforded
judges would be diminished substantially. Judges would be required to
make a searching inquiry into whether the legislation directly advances
the asserted governmental interest while still restricting the least
amount of speech. Furthermore, because this standard makes it ex-
tremely difficult to restrict the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading
speech, governments will be forced to turn to proven non-speech alter-
natives in order to achieve their asserted interest rather than restricting
speech in hopes that it will do the same. Finally, this standard will, once
Inc., 425 U.S. 748,771-72 n.24 (1976).
274. Id. Commercial speech is the "off-spring of economic self-interest, is a hardy
breed of expression that is not particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regula-
tion." Central Hudson, 557 U.S. at 564 n.6 (internal citations omitted).
275. 1d.
276. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 272, at 637.
277. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 272, at 637.
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and for all, eliminate the so-called commonsense distinctions argument
that has plagued commercial speech for over the past twenty years. In
short, this revision ultimately would tip the scales of the Central Hudson
balancing test in favor of affording commercial speech with greater con-
stitutional protection.
ANDREW S. GOLLIN"
* This Comment is dedicated to James and Deborah Gollin, Judy Walz, David Gollin,
Nancy and Dave Pangallo, Mara Tietjen, and, of course, Patricia Grisales, for their love, con-
fidence, and support over the past three years. Thank you all so very much.
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